In this paper, we estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and national calls services for private users as well as cross-price elasticities to mobile services using time series data from 2002-2007 from the Austrian market. Using instrumental variable estimates and considering cointegration, we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation.
-3-extent of intermodal competition, since this will not only be crucial for the initial analysis stage of market definition but will also determine whether retail regulation is still necessary.
FMS became a subject of interest for policy makers and economists as mobile telephony became more widely spread. A review of a number of studies primarily from the 1980s and 1990s estimating elasticities for fixed network services for different countries by the New Zealand Commerce Commission (2003) finds that demand for fixed access and usage is almost consistently estimated to be inelastic. 3 It appears that not a lot has changed since then given the results of more recent studies. Many of these newer studies find some evidence for fixed mobile substitution with regard to access 4 or calls. 5 However, not all of these studies are using price data and only few of them are actually estimating own-and cross-price elasticities. If elasticities are estimated, they still seem to be consistently in the inelastic range (Ward and Woroch, 2009) , even for long distance calls (Sung, 2003) or second fixed access lines (Rodini/Ward/Woroch, 2003) .
In a recent comprehensive literature review on fixed-mobile substitution, Vogelsang (2009) concludes that fixed and mobile access as well as call services appear to be substitutes (i.e., cross price elasticities are positive) in wealthy countries. Own price elasticities of fixed network services are usually estimated to be in the inelastic range, however, with access being much more inelastic than calls. He also points out that there are " […] very few quantitative analyses of the latest and arguably most dramatic developments".
-4-This study attempts to fill this gap. We are using relatively recent data (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) from Austria, where FMS and mobile competition is particularly advanced. In 2007, about 75% of voice traffic originated from mobile networks. 6 In addition, while most of the literature differentiates between access and usage substitution, several market segments are usually aggregated. As will be discussed later in section 2.1, market data and empirical evidence however indicate that FMS differs with regard to different market segments, e.g., residential
vs. non-residential users, or national vs. international calls. Therefore, it is worth to focus on specific segments when analysing FMS. We focus on a segment, where FMS can be expected to be high: national calls of private users. Since demand for access and usage is closely linked, we also consider access for private users. Up-to-date empirical evidence with such focus seems to be of primary importance for NRAs on the account of the increasing regulatory importance of FMS.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the main hypotheses as regards FMS, and the relevant concepts for market definition. Section 3 describes the empirical specification; Section 4 the data used in the estimation. The main estimation results are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework

Basic Hypotheses and Empirical Evidence
FMS basically suggests an opposing development of volumes in both sectors. Indeed, with regard to the mobile sector (2G and 3G) we observe a persistent growth in penetration levels of access lines and call minutes, 7 whereas access lines and usage in the fixed line sector 6 See Kruse (2007 ), chapter 3.2.3, or Analysys Research (2007 . Austria is not only advanced with regard to voice FMS, but also with regard to mobile broadband, see European Commission (2009, p. 12) 7 See European Commission (2008, Volume 1, p. 10).
-5-have been steadily decreasing in the last years. 8 It can be assumed that substitution of traditional fixed line voice telephony services by mobile telephony is the main driver of these developments. However, the influence of mobile competition varies significantly among EU and OECD countries. 9 The regulatory relevance of FMS is therefore an issue that has to be dealt with on a country specific level and market definition is therefore expected to differ across member states.
On average the decline of fixed line telephony is evident, yet, concerning substitution patterns we have to distinguish between market segments. From the old recommendationas listed in footnote 1 -we infer that market definition in principle has to be analysed along following dimensions: (i) access versus calls (ii) national calls versus international calls and (iii) residential versus non-residential consumers.
Demand for fixed narrowband access is likely to be much less elastic than demand for calls. This is suggested by past estimates as well as the fact that substitution of access is related to a discrete decision (access or no access at all), 10 whereas calls can be continuously substituted on a minute-by-minute or call-by-call basis if the user has both a fixed and a mobile connection. Of course, the complementarities between demand for access and calls imply that access substitution may also trigger complete substitution of calls. Figure 3 .8), which shows that the share of mobile revenues in total revenues differs among EU countries between 65% in the Slovak Republic, 62% in Austria (ranked second) and 26% in the Netherlands in 2007.
10 Two sub-types of access substitution might be distinguished: 'Cut the cord' means that users, who previously had access to both fixed and mobile services, have chosen to give up the fixed line entirely. 'Straight to mobile' means that some mobile-only users (such as students or young household people) never used fixed access before; see ACCC (2008, p. 9 ).
-6-mobile broadband connections lessening the attractiveness of fixed lines for the purpose of access to the internet. Although these factors contribute to both, FMS relative to access and calls, the rate of FMS seems to be much stronger with respect to calls (Vogelsang, 2009 ).
In general, FMS can be expected to be strongest with regard to national calls. It is usually much less pronounced with regard to international calls services simply because per minute prices still remain much more expensive if the call originates from a mobile (Stumpf, 2007) .
As far as consumer groups are concerned, we typically observe that FMS is most evident among a subset of predominantly residential customers: Those who do not require a fixed line for access to the internet, who are part of a single-person household and therefore do not share the costs of a fixed line with other family members or exhibit a low usage intensity and therefore benefit most from pre-paid mobile offers (Stumpf, 2007) . Non-residential or business customers, in turn, are usually much more reluctant to FMS because they tend to assign higher importance to remaining fixed network characteristics, such as quality, access to the internet and other data services. Office-based enterprises, in particular, may be concerned about reliability and coverage within buildings. Finally, business customers usually have a proportionally higher demand for international calls and some consumers seem to attach less confidence to companies which are available only via mobile numbers (ACMA, 2008) . Market data from Austria show that the decline in the number of fixed access lines and fixed network minutes is much smaller for business compared to residential customers (RTR, 2008b).
These observations motivate our focus on national calls of residential users. This is the segment where FMS is likely to be strongest. Since demand for access and usage is closely linked, we also consider access for residential users.
-7-
Conceptual Framework of Market Definition
According to the current regulatory framework for telecommunications regulation in the EU, the underlying methodology of market delineation is to be based on economic principles.
11
With respect to methodological aspects, the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT) has become standard, and as such, also part of the ex ante communications framework. 12 The HMT asks whether a small but significant non-transitory price increase from the competitive level would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist of a particular product. 'Small but significant' is interpreted as 5-10% in practice, 13 while 'non-transitory' is interpreted as a period of 1-2 years.
14 The elasticity of residual demand summarizes a firm's market power, i.e. its ability to raise prices above competitive levels and earn monopoly profits. The higher the elasticity of residual demand, the lower is the potential market power of the firm under consideration.
However, for market definition purposes one does not refer to an existing or specific firm, but to a (hypothetical) monopolistic supplier of the product in question.
In carrying out the iterative HMT procedure, cross-price elasticities constitute the most adequate method of ranking the closest substitute products. In (regulatory) practice the initial set of products as well as potential substitutes will always have to be derived on prior industry knowledge. In case of fixed network voice telephony, mobile services are by far the 11 The legal basis is the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC, Art. 15 (3)).
12 Long time before the HMT became part of the sector specific regulations framework this approach to market definition was introduced by the US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, revised in 1992 , 1997 which is currently being used by antitrust authorities worldwide, see for instance Bishop/Walker (1999, (2001) . For a description in the telecommunications sector see Briglauer (2007) . 13 The US Department of Justice refers to a 5% increase whereas the SMP-Guidelines ( § 40) refer to a 5-10% increase in price.
14 The US Department of Justice suggest a response period of one year. In ex ante framework the typical minimum period of market analyses suggest a time frame of two years.
-8-most obvious substitute candidate. Therefore conducting the HMT routine is basically tantamount to estimating the own price elasticity of fixed network services and the crossprice elasticity to mobile services.
15
Finally, in order to give a meaningful interpretation of estimated demand elasiticities, one needs a benchmark to which estimated values of the own-price elasticity can be compared.
The so called critical demand elasticity (ε c ) can be calculated a priori by making specific assumptions about cost and demand functions. Assuming the case with constant marginal cost and log-linear demand we get
stands for the competitive price-cost margin prior to the price increase (t) (Werden, 2002) .
Elasticities less than ε c imply that the price increase will increase overall profits. Elasticities greater than ε c mean that a price increase will reduce profits and that the next best substitute has to be included in the market.
Relation between access and calls
Fixed as well as mobile operators tend to set two-part tariffs for their services with a fixed fee and a per-minute calls price. 16 In our estimations we therefore have to allow for the influence of four prices on FMS: fixed network access price, mobile network access price, fixed network per minute price and mobile network per minute price. In principle, fixed-mobile access as well as call substitution can be expected to depend on all four prices. In the short run (within a few months) and given the decision to subscribe to fixed, mobile or fixed and mobile access, usage substitution may depend on calls prices only. But over a longer period of time (within several months or years), the subscription decision can also be changed.
While previous studies usually only include access or call prices or a single price which is a 15 Since retail competition in the mobile sector is usually sufficiently intense so that ex ante regulation is not needed, the cross price elasticity from mobile to fixed services is typically not of relevance for ex ante market definition purposes. See Dewenter/Haucap (2007) for a study on mobile demand elasticities in Austria.
16 Pre-paid contracts and flat-rates are extreme forms of two-part tariffs where either the access or the calls price is equal to zero.
-9-combination of both ('total revenues'), 17 we include all four prices in our model. Since access prices turn out to be insignificant in the usage model and the other way round, we eliminate them from the estimation in a second specification.
Empirical Specification
To estimate own and cross price elasticities, we specify a demand model, where demand for fixed network access or calls depends on the own price, price of a substitute and income.
The variables are used in logarithmic form and the estimated coefficients can therefore be interpreted as elasticities.
Since unit root tests 18 show that our variables are integrated of order 1, we cannot estimate our demand model in levels, but have to use first differences, which show to be stationary.
Differencing may, however, eliminate valuable information about the (long run) relationship among integrated series. We therefore also consider the possibility of cointegration and
propose an error correction model (ECM) which takes into account levels and differences.
19 Steen and Salvanes (1999) , for example, proposed a dynamic formulation of the oligopoly model of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) within an ECM and applied it to the French market for fresh salmon. An ECM allows for short-run departures from long-run equilibrium in the data, and with this approach not only statistical problems generated by short run dynamics in the data can be addressed, but also dynamic factors such as habit formation of consumers and adjustment costs for producers can be incorporated.
Here, we concentrate on the dynamics on the demand side. We formulate our basic specification for the demand for telephone services with an ECM such that 17 An exception is Rodini/Ward/Woroch (2002) who include access and calls prices for fixed and mobile telephony. Access and usage prices are not directly observed but estimated from monthly (total) bills, however. 18 The results are available from the authors upon request.
19 See Davidson/MacKinnon (1993) for a detailed description of the error correction model.
where Q(t) denotes quantity, P(t) the price, W(t) the price of the substitute, i.e. price of mobile phone, Y(t) income and D(1) to D(m) are dummy variables that account for seasonal effects.
µ(t) is the statistical error term. β(1) is the short run elasticity, α(1) the long run elasticity.
We estimate equation (1) with a two-step procedure following the so-called Bardsen (1989) transformation. First, we estimate equation (1) to obtain a consistent estimate of γ, i.e. ˆ.
Then, we construct ΔQ(t) -ˆQ(t-1) and regress it on the remaining explanatory variables in equation (1). Instead of getting the long-run parameters directly from a non-linear estimation procedure, with this procedure we obtain the long-run parameters by dividing all the estimated level parameters by ˆ. At the same time we have to solve the well known endogeneity problem associated with the estimation of demand equations. To account for the endogeneity of output and prices, we estimate equation (1) with two-stage least squares (TSLS) using instruments for ΔP(t) in the first step and for P(t-1) and ΔP(t) in the second step.
Data
Since the HMT refers to the aggregate product level we do not analyse firm-specific data.
20
As outlined before, we analyse the market segments of national calls of residential (private) customers and access of private customers. All data have been collected by the Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications (RTR GmbH) directly from all operators in the market. 20 Another approach would be to use consumer survey data as in Reiss and White (2004) . Unfortunately, such data is not available to us. We therefore estimate an average elasticity over the observed time period, while consumer survey data would give an elasticity for a particular point in time. We also cannot differentiate between groups of (residential) consumers.
-11-
We use monthly data 21 on prices and quantities in Austria over the period from January 2002
to December 2007. As quantities we use the number of subscribers in the fixed network and the traffic volume (total number of national call minutes fixed to fixed and fixed to mobile).
Prices are constructed by calculating the average revenue of access (per subscriber) and calls (per minute) as a proxy for the access and the calls price in fixed and mobile networks.
To obtain real prices, we deflate our price data using the Austrian consumer price index. To control for changes in income we use a production index which is highly correlated with GDP, 22 and to control for seasonal patterns in demand we use seasonal dummy variables.
Since prices and quantities are determined simultaneously in equilibrium, we need instruments for the fixed network price(s) in order to identify the demand equation. Ideally, an instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous variable, and uncorrelated with the error term. In the context of demand estimation, cost shifters are likely to be such instruments. This will affect the mobile price variables which are calculated as revenues divided by volumes. Since the monthly available part of these data shows a rather smooth trend we believe that such an approach is permissible. Any measurement error biases our results towards zero. 22 The index is available on a monthly basis while GDP is only available on a quarterly basis. 23 We also considered lagged endogenous variables as instruments. A test for exclusionary restrictions shows that these variables are not exogenous and could therefore not be used as instruments.
-12-
(ii) The number of fixed network access lines: A change in the number of access lines will not directly affect the variable costs of a call, but will -due to the high share of fixed costs -effect average costs.
(iii)
The number of broadband and voice over broadband subscribers: An increasing broadband penetration results in economies of scope as the access line is used for voice and broadband. This may result in technological cost savings for voice telephony if 'voice over broadband' (an access based form of IP telephony) is used. 24 Since the number of access lines is the dependent variable in the access equation, it cannot be used as an instrument there. It can also be questioned whether the number of access lines is exogenous with regard to the demand for calls. Our tests do not reject this assumption. In addition, the results do not change qualitatively if the number of access lines is not used as an instrument.
-13- 
Estimation Results
To obtain own and cross price elasticities, we estimate equation (1) for calls and access. We describe the results with regard to calls in section 5.1 and the results with regard to access in section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the implications for market definition and regulation.
Calls
As discussed in section 2.3, we estimate two models in order to deal with the two-part tariff nature of fixed and mobile telephony prices. The estimated long run own price elasticities are significant and in the elastic range. This is true for the OLS as well as the TSLS estimates in both models. The long run cross price elasticities is positive and significant (with the exception of the TSLS estimate for model 1)
suggesting that mobile calls are a substitute to fixed calls. We regard Model 2 as our preferred model, since we gain some efficiency be eliminating the insignificant access prices.
The short-run own and cross price elasticities are -as expected -smaller in absolute values than the long run elasticities. With the exception of the TSLS estimate in Model 1, the short run own price elasticities are in the inelastic range. The short run cross price elasticities are not significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the monthly frequency of the data.
Some consumers may not switch or cancel contracts due to minimum contract durations;
other consumers may be sluggish or not well informed.
The estimated coefficient on γ is around -0.4 implying that the demand bounces back to the long run equilibrium path within two and a half months (1/0.4) after a shock had occurred. 25 The delta method calculates standard errors using a Taylor series expansion. See for example, Ramanathan (1993. pp. 89-90 ).
-15- Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *.
Standard errors are corrected using the delta method. Estimation is done in two steps (see section 3). Table 2 reports the results from the second step (long run elasticities have already been divided by ˆ) as well as the adjustment parameter ˆ from the first step.
-16-To test the validity of the instruments, we test for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage of each estimation step. It turns out that the instruments are jointly significant in the first stage for endogenous variables in levels, but not in differences. 26 The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous given that at least one of the instruments is exogenous.
Access
Prices and quantities of access are also integrated of order one. So we estimated the same error correction model as for calls. However, the coefficient on the adjustment parameter ˆ is insignificant implying no significant cointegrating relation between the variables.
We therefore estimate the model in first differences:
)*ΔP(t) + β(2)*ΔW(t) + β(3)*ΔY(t) + ε(t)
Similar to calls, we estimate two model specifications. Model 1 includes four prices, namely p_fn_use, p_fn_acc, p_mn_use, p_mn_acc. Model 2 includes only the access prices p_fn_acc, p_mn_acc. The estimation results are depicted in Table 3 . We included 2 AR-terms to deal with autocorrelation in the residuals.
The coefficient on Δp_fn_acc(t) can be interpreted as the short run own-price elasticity. It is significant but very small, i.e., inelastic. This is true for the OLS as well as for the TSLS estimation in both models. The short-run cross-price elasticity is negative, but very small and not significantly different from zero in all cases. This suggests that mobile access is not a substitute for fixed access for private users. 26 The detailed results of the first stages can be obtained from the authors upon request.
-17- The long-run elasticity can be calculated from the short-run elasticities and the AR-terms as in (3). The long run own-price access elasticities are also in the inelastic range.
To test the validity of the instruments, we test for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage. The instruments for the access estimations are predominantly weak. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are equal to zero for (Δp_fn_acc) in Model 1 as well as in Model 2. The instruments are however jointly significant for (Δp_fn_use)
-18-in Model 1. 27 The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous given that at least one of the instruments is exogenous.
Implications for market definition and regulation
To arrive at conclusions for market definition, the estimated long-run elasticities have to be compared to the critical elasticity, ε c .
With regard to access, the estimated elasticity is very small and therefore does not exceed the critical elasticity in any event (the smallest possible value of the critical elasticity being 0.91 in case of PCM=1 and t=10%). Cross price elasticities are also insignificant. The estimate therefore indicates that mobile access is not part of the same market as fixed access for residential customers.
To determine ε c for national calls of private customers, we have to estimate the share of variable costs in total costs to determine the competitive price-cost margin. As regards the definition of variable costs we have to refer to the relevant time horizon of the HMT, i.e., 1 to 2 years. Based on data available from operators, we estimate variable costs for calls (e.g.
interconnection capacity, off-net termination, bad debt) 28 to be 25% at the maximum for network operators, yielding a competitive price-cost margin of 75%. Depending on t (5% or 10%), we get -1,32 ≤ ε c ≤ -1.31 for calls.
29
The estimated long run elasticities for calls clearly exceed the range of the critical elasticity.
This indicates that fixed and mobile national calls of private users are part of the same 27 The detailed results of the first stages can be obtained from the authors upon request. 28 Given an existing network, network costs (equipment, repair and maintenance, etc.) hardly vary with the amount of calls. Even marketing, billing and customer care is not or hardly dependent on the amount of calls made but rather on the amount of users.
29 Stumpf (2007) estimates price-cost margins for fixed calls to be in the proximity of 60-90%. It is not further specified how this estimate is derived. Nevertheless, we use these values, which imply a critical elasticity of -1.11
to -1.64 in the case of isoelastic demand, as a robustness check. Our conclusions do not change. A smaller share of variable costs (e.g. 0%) on the other hand would only reinforce our conclusions. 31 Although one has to take into account that the fixed network incumbent and the largest mobile operator are part of the same company. Nevertheless, the Austrian Regulatory Authority RTR concluded that fixed network retail market(s) for residential users are no longer relevant for ex ante regulation as there are still four fully integrated network operators and competition is therefore considered to be sustainable (see RTR (2008b) ). 32 As it can be inferred from European Commission (2008, volume 2, figure 37) intramodal competition is most pronounced with respect to international calls. Indeed, those markets were the first ones to be deregulated since the first recommendation was introduced (Cullen International, 2008 ).
-20-decisions are taken, we focus on the segment of private users and estimate demand elasticities for access and national calls.
As expected, given the highly intense mobile competition in Austria we find evidence for FMS with respect to calls. Furthermore, we find empirical support for our hypotheses according to which FMS is much less pronounced as regards retail access. Whereas we found that demand for access services is inelastic (as also found in most other past studies, see e.g. Vogelsang, 2009 ) and that the cross price elasticity to mobile is insignificant throughout all of our model specifications, estimates for calls show elastic demand and a significant positive cross price effect. As the estimated elasticity of national calls of private users likely exceeds the critical elasticity, we conclude that national fixed and mobile calls of private users are likely to be part of the same market.
An own-price elasticity for fixed calls which is clearly in the elastic range is an unusual result, as the brief literature review in the beginning of the paper and the (more comprehensive) survey by Vogelsang (2009) show. We believe that this is mainly due to three reasons: (i)
Compared to other European countries, Austria is very advanced in the use of mobile phones and with regard to fixed mobile substitution as measured, e.g., by the share of mobile minutes/revenues in total minutes/revenues or the share of mobile only households or mobile broadband lines (see section 2.1).
(ii) We look at national calls of residential users only, while most other studies consider aggregates over several market segments. The segment we look at is likely to be more elastic due to competition from mobile telephony than other segments (international calls or calls of business users). (iii) Compared to most other studies, our estimates are based on relatively recent data, and as also pointed out by Vogelsang (2009), with increasing mobile penetration and decreasing mobile prices, substitutability between fixed and mobile calls likely increases over time.
Fixed and mobile access for private users, on the other hand are unlikely to be part of the same market based on our evidence. In this respect, one has to say, however, that mobile broadband, which might significantly increase the willingness of consumers to switch from -21-fixed to mobile access, only started to take off in Austria in 2007, which is the last year of our
sample. An estimate based on more recent data might therefore result in higher elasticities.
What could this mean for other markets? Since elasticities in the business segment can be assumed to be significantly lower than in the residential segment, we would expect that fixed and mobile telephony (be it access or calls) not to form a single market. The same goes for international calls, where significant price differences between fixed and mobile still prevail.
Since Austria is among the countries with the highest FMS in the EU, it is even questionable, from our point of view, if FMS in strong enough in other EU countries (even for national calls of residential customers). But these are certainly fields for future research.
